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   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
 
No. 14-3669 
________________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
    
 v. 
 
NATALYA SHVETS, 
   Appellant 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania  
(D.C. No. 2-12-cr-00112-002) 
District Judge:  Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno 
_____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
November 17, 2015 
 
Before:  AMBRO, HARDIMAN, and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion filed:  November 20, 2015) 
 
______________________ 
 
OPINION 
______________________ 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
Natalya Shvets appeals her conviction for conspiracy to commit health care fraud 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349 and for health care fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
                                              
  This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
§§ 1347 and 2.1  A jury found Shvets guilty of conspiracy and seven substantive health 
care fraud offenses. She now argues that the District Court committed reversible error 
based on the instruction given to the jury as to the meaning of “willfully” under § 1347.  
(Gov. Br. 3; PSR ¶ 2.)   
Shvets argues that § 1347 requires “proving defendant’s knowledge of the statutes 
alleged to make her conduct criminal,” and, furthermore, that the “knowingly and 
willfully” element attaches to a separate provision defining “health care benefit 
program[s]” as those which “affect[] commerce.”  Appellant’s Br. at 15-16 (citing 18 
U.S.C. § 24(b)). 
For the following reasons, we will affirm. 
I. Background 
On March 21, 2012, a federal grand jury in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
indicted Natalya Shvets, along with four other defendants, on conspiracy to commit 
health care fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349, as well as multiple substantive counts 
of health care fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1347 and 2.  (App. 23-39.)  On March 
25, 2014, the jury convicted Shvets as charged.  (App. 1823-25.) 
The charges concerned Shvets’ employment as a nurse for Home Care Hospice, 
Inc. (“HCH”), a for-profit provider of hospice services.  (App. 23.)  HCH received 
insurance reimbursements for “providing home care and in-facility care to purportedly 
                                              
1 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over the case pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231.  We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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terminally ill patients with life expectancy prognoses of six months or less.”  App. at 23.  
In particular, Medicare paid more for patients reported as requiring “continuous care,” 
defined as at least eight hours of service per day with a majority of the care provided by a 
nurse.  42 C.F.R. § 418.302. 
According to the indictment and testimony elicited at trial, Shvets (along with 
other nurses at HCH) agreed to create false records documenting continuous care claims 
(Gov. Br. 6-7, App. 592-600.) and subsequently prepared numerous fictitious schedules 
and nursing notes, for which she was individually paid $20 per hour.  (App. 434, 443-52.)  
In total, HCH received $253,196 as a result of the conspiracy in which Shvets 
participated.  (Gov. Br. 7, PSR 17.) 
At trial, defense counsel moved for a Rule 29(a) judgment of acquittal, arguing 
that the Government “ha[d] to show that [Shvets] actually did something which she knew 
that the law forbids” and that Shvets “ha[d] to know of those provisions in order to 
violate them.”  App. at 1581, 1583.  Defense counsel analogized the healthcare fraud 
statute to structuring, wherein the Government “ha[s] to show not only knowledge that 
it’s illegal to structure, . . . to prevent a bank from filing a currency transaction report, but 
moreover, that [the defendant has] specific knowledge that the regulations make it illegal 
for [the defendant] to do that.”  App. at 1583. 
The Government opposed the Rule 29(a) motion, arguing that “the healthcare 
fraud statute does not require that the [defendant] . . . have a complete understanding of 
what the Medicare . . . regulations embrace.”  App. at 1583-84.  Defense counsel 
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conceded that “if ‘willfully’ is just defined as knowledge that you[r] conduct was wrong, 
bring it to the jury,” and acknowledged that if the pattern Third Circuit instruction on 
“willfulness” applied, the Rule 29 motion would be defeated.  App. at 1584.  
Subsequently, defense counsel again admitted that “if it’s general willfulness, . . . I 
think they get to the jury.”  App. at 1594-95.  He also noted the legislative history of 
§ 1347, which included a Congressional “conflict report” regarding the Senate’s addition 
of “willfully” to the statute.  App. at 1595-96.  The District Court clarified that, in 
essence, defense counsel was arguing that a 2010 amendment to § 1347 (defining 
willfulness) amounted to “a substantive change” and that the issue therefore, was 
“whether or not [the change was meant to] simply . . . clarify or whether . . . it filled in a 
gap.”  App. at 1596.  
Following additional discussion, defense counsel stated that he now believed that 
the government’s willfulness instruction “get[s] to the jury.”  App. at 1609.  He 
continued, “We did the research . . . .  It was a clarifying amendment. . . . So they have to 
show what I call general willfulness, an intent to disregard or disobey the law.”  App. at 
1609.  The Court ultimately denied the defendant’s Rule 29 motion.  (App. 1614.) 
The Court then turned to the arguments regarding jury instructions.  (App. 1627.)  
The Court noted that the parties agreed to the use of Third Circuit Model Jury 
Instructions 5.02 (“Knowingly”) and 5.05 (“Willfully”).  The Government then argued 
for the inclusion of optional language in pattern instruction 5.05: “Willfully does not 
require proof that the actor know of the existence and meaning of the statute making his 
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conduct criminal.”  App. at 1637.  Defense counsel replied, “Well, judge, I agree.”  App. 
at 1638.  Defense counsel continued, “That was the whole point of that legislative history 
research I did on the 2010 amendment. . . .  That just codifies the question if we have to 
go over the statute specifically, and if you do, you get charged on it, and if you don’t you 
don’t.”  App. at 1638.  The Court adjourned the hearing and brought the jury in for 
closing arguments.  (App. 1638-39.) 
The Court delivered the following instructions to the jury on the willfulness:  
[T]o find Natalya Shvets acted willfully, you must find that the evidence 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that she acted with a purpose to disobey 
or disregard the law.  ‘Willfully’ does not, however, require proof that 
Natalya Shvets had an evil motive or a bad purpose, other than the purpose 
to disobey or disregard the law.  ‘Willfully’ does not require proof that the 
act toward the defendant in this case knew of the existence and meaning of 
a statute making her conduct criminal.  
 
App. at 1773-74.  
The jury convicted Shvets of all charges.  (App. 1823-26.) 
II. Analysis 
A. Standard of Review 
We must first decide what standard of review to apply to the District Court’s 
willfulness instruction.  Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 30, a party’s failure to 
object limits our review to whether the District Court committed a plain error.  Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 30(d); 52(b).  The Government argues that Shvets did not object to the jury 
instruction. 
We agree.  There is no evidence that Shvets’ trial counsel objected to the use of 
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the final instruction on willfulness, either before or after the Court charged the jury.  
Instead, defense counsel stated that he “agree[d]” with the “willfulness” instruction 
argued for by the Government, thereby abandoning his prior argument for a stricter level 
of intent.  Defense counsel did request in writing a “willfulness” instruction that would 
have required the Government to “prove that Natalya Shvets . . . knew of the existence 
and meaning of the statute and regulations which the government alleges made her 
conduct criminal.”  App. at 110.  However, merely requesting the charge before the jury 
retires “[does not] preserve an objection to the instruction actually given by the court.”  
United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 221 (3d Cir. 2005) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 388 (1999)).  As a result of Shvets’ failure to 
object, her claim may be reviewed only for plain error.  See United States v. Flores, 454 
F.3d 149, 156 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 30; Gov't of the Virgin Islands v. 
Knight, 989 F.2d 619, 631 (3d Cir. 1993)). 
B. Plain Error Analysis 
Under the plain error standard, we may reverse the District Court’s ruling only if 
(1) an error occurred, (2) the error was plain, and (3) the error “affected the defendant’s 
substantial rights.”  United States v. Syme, 276 F.3d 131, 143 n.4 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Nappi, 243 F.3d 758, 762 (3d Cir. 
2001)).  An “error” by a trial court is “[a] deviation from a legal rule in circumstances in 
which the legal rule has not been waived.”  Govt. of Virgin Islands v. Rosa, 399 F.3d 283, 
290 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-33 (1993)).   
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i. Waiver 
Shvets did not waive her objection to the willfulness instruction—she merely 
forfeited it.  “Whereas forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right, 
waiver is the ‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.’”  Olano, 507 
U.S. at 733 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).  Unlike waiver, 
forfeiture does not preclude review: “[W]hen a legal rule has been waived, an appeal 
based upon the nonadherence to that legal principle is precluded.  If, however, the correct 
application of the rule merely was ‘forfeited,’ Rule 52(b) provides a basis for review.” 
Rosa, 399 F.3d at 290 (footnote omitted); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 30(d) (allowing 
review pursuant to Rule 52(b) when counsel fails to object).  Since the record evidences 
that Shvets’ counsel merely acquiesced to, and did not specifically request, the 
willfulness instruction as given by the trial court, we may reach the merits of her 
argument.  Cf. United States v. Holmes, 607 F.3d 332, 335 (3d Cir. 2010). 
ii. Willfulness 
The jury instruction for “willfully” used by the trial court was not erroneous.  
Section 1347 makes it illegal to “knowingly and willfully . . . defraud any health care 
benefit program.”  Although “willfully” is a “notoriously slippery term,” United States v. 
Starnes, 583 F.3d 196, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted), it is generally defined as 
“act[ing] with knowledge that [one’s] conduct was unlawful.”  Bryan v. United States, 
524 U.S. 184, 192 (1998) (quoting Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 137 (1994)).  
The proper definition of “willfully” under § 1347 hinges primarily on the nature of 
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a 2010 amendment to the statute, which states that “[w]ith respect to violations of this 
section, a person need not have actual knowledge of this section or specific intent to 
commit a violation of this section.”  18 U.S.C. § 1347(b).  The pre-2010 version of 
§ 1347, under which Shvets was charged and convicted, does not contain this provision 
and is silent as to the definition of willfulness under the statute.  Therefore, the question 
is whether the 2010 amendment represents a substantive change in the statute’s mens rea 
requirement, or whether it was merely clarifying in nature. 
As conceded by Shvets’ trial counsel, the legislative history of the 2010 
amendment forecloses Shvets’ current argument that § 1347 requires proof of the 
defendant’s knowledge of the statute.  See 155 Cong. Rec. S10853 (daily ed. Oct. 28, 
2009) (statement of Sen. Kaufman) (“The bill . . . addresses confusion [and] . . . clarifies 
that ‘willful conduct’ in this context does not require proof that the defendant had actual 
knowledge of the law in question or specific intent to violate that law.”). And the weight 
of the case law interpreting § 1347 and the analogous Anti-Kickback statute, 42 U.S.C. § 
1320a-7b, only strengthens this conclusion.  See United States v. Davis, 132 F.3d 1092, 
1094 (5th Cir. 1998) (requiring “specific intent to do something the law forbids; that is to 
say, with bad purpose either to disobey or disregard the law”); United States v. Starks, 
157 F.3d 833, 837–39 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that knowledge of the Anti-Kickback 
statute was not required); United States v. Jain, 93 F.3d 436, 440-41 (8th Cir. 1996) 
(requiring proof that the defendant “knew that his conduct was wrongful, rather than 
proof that he knew it violated a known legal duty”); United States Baystate Ambulance & 
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Hosp. Rental Serv., Inc., 874 F.2d 20, 33 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding that “willfully” means 
to do something the law prohibits). 
The only court of appeals to find that the pre-2010 version of § 1347 or the Anti-
Kickback statute required a heightened level of intent is the Ninth Circuit.  See Hanlester 
Network v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 1390, 1400 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that “knowingly and 
willfully” in the Anti-Kickback statute required defendants to have knowledge of the 
statute and “specific intent to disobey the law”).  However, the 2010 amendment to 
§ 1347 rejected this interpretation, codifying the majority view.  See 155 Cong. Rec. 
S10853 (daily ed. Oct. 28, 2009) (statement of Sen. Kaufman) (“This heightened mental 
state requirement may be appropriate for criminal violations of hyper-technical 
regulations, but it is inappropriate for these crimes, which punish simple fraud.”). 
The District Court’s willfulness instruction was not erroneous.  But even if it were, 
any such error was not “plain” as is required for us to reverse under the plain error 
standard.  Because there was no plain error in this case, it is unnecessary to examine 
whether Shvets’ “substantial rights” were affected by the instruction as given.  
III. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we deny Shvets’ appeal and affirm the judgment of 
conviction of the District Court.  
